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Chapter 13
Settlement patterns,
land tenure and
social structure:
a diachronic model1
John Bintliff
Changes over time in settlement behaviour and land-use
strategies in prehistoric and early historic Greece are linked
to parallel socio-economic developments, in particular to the
rise and elaboration of ranking, via known and inferred
patterns of land tenure. In situations of population pressure,
'achieved'statuses based on landed wealth are converted to
'ascribed' formal rank, through such mechanisms as the
'client'system and 'cargo'redistributive system, typical for
recent peasant societies. Parallels with Roman and Saxon
society are drawn, and lead to a reinterpretation of Celtic
society in the pre-Roman period.
I began this area of research with a set of archae-
ological observations on settlement numbers for the prehis-
toric and ancient periods in south-central mainland Greece,
considered (as in the pioneering study by Colin Renfrew,
1972a) to relate to population fluctuations (fig. 13.1). The
peaks are periods of high culture or civilisation (fig. 13.2),
early bronze age, late bronze age or Mycenaean, and classical
Greece. This is not a surprising finding in itself. But seen in
the field over several hundred sites, more archaeological and
geographical detail can be added,2 taking modules of 2%-
5 km radius (fig. 13.3): a patterning not just in number but
in size of sites appears. In neolithic times our archaeological
Fig. 13.1 and 13.2. Population fluctuations during the pie-
historic and ancient periods in south-central mainland Greece
(fig. 13.1); periods of high culture/civilisation during the pre-
historic and ancient periods in south-central mainland Greece
(fig. 13.2).
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palimpsest suggests a loose scatter of hamlets, and low popu-
lation, leading to the high culture of the early bronze age
with a very dense scatter of farms and hamlets together with
some district foci — a simple settlement hierarchy, high
population; followed by a decline of population in the
middle bronze age associated with nucleation into hamlets
and villages; then by mature Mycenaean times a vigorous
expansion of population, with the nucleated settlements
blossoming into regional centres, surrounded by a network of
lower settlement levels; another serious decline in the Dark
Ages, low population and a loose scatter of nucleated ham-
lets, until the Late Geometric/Archaic revival of population
leading into the Classical civilisation, with central places
surrounded by a network of villages, hamlets and dispersed
farms; finally a decline in the Hellenistic and Roman periods.
Again, this is not a very surprising picture of the complex
spatial organisation of civilisations, and its contrary in
periods of less complex or vigorous local culture.3
The impetus behind these population expansions is
variously interpreted — new cultigens such as the olive, the
effect of novel iron tools, or the simple stimulus to produce
more surplus by a burgeoning elite. But consider the ortho-
dox explanations of these cyclical periods of complex and
rudimentary social and settlement structure: they stress
internal and external trade and exchange, and regional
servicing, while surpluses for these purposes are obtained via
the often unclearly stated allegiance of the peasant to the
elite. Perhaps we are offered a kinship obligation, a social
pyramid surmounted by a paramount chief, and from this
leadership a further supportive following is attracted by the
provision of redistributed prestige objects or raw materials,
or regular feasts.4
Let us approach this issue in an entirely different
fashion, by turning to ancient Greek and Roman civilisation,
and in particular their social systems and their economy as
admirably analysed by Finley (1973), Jones (1964), Hopkins
(1978) and Andrewes ( 1977). The dominant theme of their
writings is that the central source of wealth, status and politi-
cal power in the ancient world lay in control of agricultural
produce, and in the most direct way via the ownership of
large private estates. Private land and the control over
dependent labour or sharecropping tenants provide for the
maintenance of the dominant ruling elite, together with its
luxuries, and by definition landholding controls the right to
power and decision-making: government offices are con-
ditional upon high property qualifications.
Might we envisage a similar society, at least for
Mycenaean and Archaic times, in which the ruling elites,
betrayed archaeologically and historically, arose and were
maintained by private dominance of land? Could we
hypothesise that most peasants were tenants or labourers for
these landowners, and that the supply of food surplus that
fed the elite and its followers, supported their craft sectors
and exchange relationships, came from the private wealth of
a landed elite? Finally, were such a structure to be argued for
Mycenaean and Archaic society, could we find any archae-
ological trace of it? Let us return to our model Greek land-
scape. I believe the populations of these modules were
supported predominantly by local food production. There-
fore, the cyclical alternation of population seen here must
reflect intensification and deintensification of land use. In
periods of low population, large areas of the module went
out of permanent cultivation (fig. 13.4). So the contrasted
nucleation and dispersion of population must relate to a
cyclical shift from, on the one hand, small infield round the
low population centres, surrounded by extensive outfield, to,
on the other hand, a vigorous pushing back of outfield to
minimal proportions and a massive intake into intensive
cultivation of the outer lands. Could this very conversion of
the outfield be a major force in the rise of very complex
stratified society? Let me suggest that middle bronze age and
Dark Age hamlets communally controlled the infield land,
with chieftains and 'big men' making more effective use of
the outfield (perhaps notably with stock) and with larger
than average infield holdings. Some of this wealthier
peasantry stimulated the intake of the outfield into intensive
use, by economic support for poorer peasants who became
Fig. 13.3. Model modules representing changing settlement
patterns in prehistoric and ancient Greece.
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sharecroppers in the new intake. Thereby some of the chiefs/
'big men' became major landholders, with a large and grow-
ing body of peasant tenants.5
But how does this economic elite rise to political auth-
ority? In Roman government, we see the virtual restriction of
official roles to those able to cover the expenses of the job,
the costs of public feasts, assistance to the needy of the com-
munity and to the maintenance of community facilities. An
excellent parallel can be found amongst Latin American
peasant societies, in the Cargo System.6 In any case, the
dependence of a major part of the populace on the land-
owners in a patron— client relationship would be a powerful
factor in concentrating community authority into the hands
of the few. With communal dues being amalgamated with
private wealth, the politico-economic nexus would be com-
plete. Historically, such a transition as is here postulated,
from wealthy peasant class to district political elite with
hereditary privileges, has been eloquently documented for
medieval communities in the Pyrenees by Lefebvre (1963).
In a further stage of development, our local ruling families
integrate with those of adjacent districts, from whence
regional dynasties arise, higher levels of central people living
in equivalent central places; finally, regional networks inter-
connect via nodal royal families in supra-regional central
places: nascent palaces and cities.7
This is the controversial interpretation proposed: is
there support in the historical evidence? For the archaic pro-
logue to classical civilisation in Greece, the historical sources
are unanimous in offering a picture of city-state societies for
the most part ruled by aristocratic elites, whose means of
support and control are argued to be their dominance in
Fig. 13.4. Model modules representing changing land use in
prehistoric and ancient Greece.
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ownership of productive land. The importance of trade, war-
fare and industry for archaic Greece, as for the ancient
Greco-Roman world in general, is minimal in comparison to
this fundamental connection between class, power and the
land.8
What of Mycenaean civilisation? That expert on the
Mycenaean archives, John Chadwick, offers this interpret-
ation (fig. 13.5) of Mycenaean landholding: apart from large
estates assigned to the King and his chief ministers, the land
is split fairly equally, at least in one district for which we
have a total record, between private and state land. The
private land is owned by a numerous class of local nobles,
comparable to a squirearchy, and from their ranks it seems
provincial governors are chosen. Half of them sublet to a
yeoman peasant class, who are believed to be men of sub-
stantial incomes. The importance of local estate owners in
running local government and regional troop contingents
could well reflect, in Chadwick's view, a preceding period in
which each region was far more independent and run by the
chief landowners as petty chiefdoms. Public land is assigned
to a number of people, often high-ranking, under some
obligation, probably for fulfilment of official duties. But
most of it, in our one complete district, is tenanted out to a
group called 'slaves of the deity' who are apparently the
majority of the population of that region.9 Two things are
striking: firstly, virtually all the land is owned by the
nobility, either by private inheritance or by virtue of their
role as officials. Secondly, what about the poorer peasantry,
a class that on calculations from the archives and estimates
from archaeology of population density, should have been in
the majority? There are grounds for seeing it as a serf popu-
lation, possibly represented by the term used for the
majority of state tenants — 'slaves'.
In conclusion, in the archaeological survey data for late
prehistoric and early historic Greece, we are possibly witness-
ing the spatial correlates of socio-economic and political
changes of vital importance to the rise and maintenance of
highly stratified societies.
To what extent can this process be seen elsewhere, if
Fig. 13.5. Mycenaean landholding (after J. Chadwick).
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we question orthodox explanations for the inception of pro-
nounced political strata in complex societies?
The development of the Roman republic, then that of
the empire, represents the story of a society in which power
and decision-making remained in the hands of an elite
defined by landholding qualifications (fig. 13.6).10 This
oligarchy pursued single-mindedly its own interests, military
prestige and booty, in a succession of wars of conquest, by
manipulating the majority of the populace, who were
excluded from effective power by landowning inequalities.
This land-based power was consolidated through the late
republic by the virtual swallowing up of the landscape into
large private estates, at the expense of tire independent
peasant smallholder. He was removed from the land by com-
pulsory service in the wars of conquest, where he went as
cannon-fodder to distant colonies, or, returning, became a
tenant on the estates or swelled the urban poor. He was
most frequently replaced in the countryside by slaves from
the wars. The local land-based power was exported with the
growth of empire to form new, but regionally rooted,
provincial power strata along similar lines. In the late Roman
period landholdings revert to an Archaic pattern, with the
tying of peasantry to great estates and the corresponding
decline of agricultural slave labour. Under this 'colonate'
system the bulk of the peasantry were reduced both in law
and achieved fact to the status of serfs. The continuity of
Fig. 13.6. The growth of slavery in Roman Italy (after Hopkins
1978).
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this social pattern in the eastern empire over the Dark Ages,
and the suspected continuity in parts of the west such as
Gaul and the Rhineland, are fundamental to the origins of
mediaeval feudal societies in many regions of Europe. But
further north and west we must assume virtually a complete
discontinuity for the early Dark Ages, for example, in
England. However, by mature Saxon times there seems to
have occurred in these regions a rebirth of the process of
gross landowning differentiation: for the sources, but only
imperfectly the archaeology, indicate once again a highly
stratified society founded on large estates and defined by a
pyramid of landownership. From these two strands, one of
continuity, the other of renewal, the mediaeval economy and
its dependent socio-political system of land feudalism
arose.11 Professor Postan (1972) quotes with approval the
words of Maitland: 'The estate became the state.'
In the light of the evidence presented hitherto for the
primacy of landholding in late prehistoric and ancient
Greece, and subsequently over most of Europe throughout
the historical period till the high Middle Ages, are there other
opportunities for application of the model? What of Celtic
civilisation and its distinctive aristocratic society? In current
views of the origins and development of this society, in par-
ticular specific studies of the social system such as that of
Crumley (1974), or of Frankenstein and Rowlands (1978),
the emphasis is on the role of external trade from the more
advanced Mediterranean civilisations as a stimulus to
increased internal political differentiation. Controlled access
to external manufactures and prestige items, as the prime
factor in this process, is seen to succeed the earlier operation
of internal redistribution to their followers by aspiring nobles
of regional craft products and raw materials. Food production
is seen as a minor consideration, in some traditional way
available as a surplus to the nobles, usually via a kinship net-
work. Could we turn the tables on this approach, and look
for evidence that food surplus and the allegiance of primarily
subsistence peasants are the fundamental source of wealth
and status for the social hierarchy? Let us hypothesise once
more that private landownership is crucial, and that we are at
a social and economic stage well beyond mere kinship obli-
gations. An argument might now be put forward to the effect
that an elite thus established utilises its regional power for
obtaining prestige objects and raw materials, but that such
goods are not vital to the power of the elite, its grip on the
peasantry or the support of lesser nobles; indeed, much is
merely a symbol of conspicuous consumption.
The most detailed study of pre-Roman Celtic social
structure is by Daphne Nash: The Celts of Central Gaul
(1975). She analyses exhaustively all available data from
historical sources, the later sagas and law books, and indi-
cations from the archaeological record. That evidence points
to a society built on local agriculture, in which social status
and political power stem from landholding qualifications,
and in which the ruling nobility live primarily off large
estates manned by tenants, tied labour and slaves, together
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with a share of the crops produced by their free client
farmers. The lower classes are only semi-free; the wealthier
peasant or yeoman class has a minimal say in political power.
Real power resides within the nobility proper, and rests upon
the labour and physical support of private armies of free,
semi-free and unfree client and slave cultivators.
The whole system was at an extreme point of stress by
the Roman conquest: the peasant majority lay under a crush-
ing weight of obligations to the elite. Nash finds Caesar's
Commentary to this effect totally in harmony with the evi-
dence from all other sources, and, significantly, they argue
for such a system being in operation as far back as early La
Tène times. The origin of this peasant oppression she places
securely within an indigenous process of gross differentiation
in landholding, as I would. If this model is highly plausible
for La Tène times, with a high level of Mediterranean influ-
ence, surely it is even more relevant for Hallstatt Celtic
society with its lower levels of external contact? So might
we look once more at the neglected importance of the
indigenous rather than the over-emphasised exogenous
factors creating striking social stratification in Celtic Europe?
Finally, one further insight can be added to the overall
analysis offered in this paper (returning to fig. 13.4). Is there
any significance to an intensification of land use followed so
systematically by a reversion to a different order of use? Let
me suggest, following recent discussions on demography and
carrying capacity, that the level of totally secure food
extraction, or population carried, relative to the total con-
ceivable carrying capacity (a ratio which ethno-historic
analogues are beginning to indicate at around 30%), is
reflected in our 'low' population periods, whilst the massive
land intake of our climax civilisations pushes far beyond this.
Preliminary analyses for classical Greece12 suggest that the
level of actual population to potential carrying capacity was
as high as 80%, arguably a dangerous over-exploitation seen
in the long-term. Mycenaean analyses are being processed.
Are the seeds of decline for both civilisations perhaps already
visible here, creating a marginal situation merely precipitated
by internal conflict, external pressures, or climatic fluctu-
ations? Precisely this sequence can be demonstrated for
mediaeval western Europe, where expansion into the outfield
and marginal lands under the feudal aristocracy brought
economic ruin, and was largely responsible for the collapse of
feudal society itself.
Notes
1 This essay is a brief summary of a much longer and more
detailed study on the same theme, shortly to be published. It
can therefore only suggest the nature of ihe evidence available
to support these wide-ranging and, I hope, provocative state-
ments and hypotheses.
2 Some relevant basic data can be found in the publication of my
Ph.D. thesis (1977a), and the volume I edited entitled
Mycenaean Geography (1977b), but much is still in prep-
aration; see also Snodgrass 1977.
3 The indications of a serious decline in settlement numbers and
overall population in southern Greece, on the basis of archae-
ological survey results for the Hellenistic and early Roman
periods, are very much as expected from a study of contem-
porary sources. Amongst these, Strabo, and most especially
Pausanias, offer a depressing catalogue of abandoned lands and
run-down towns. Of course both periods were dominated by
civilisations within which southern Greece formed a provincial
limb. But archaeology and history combine to show us that
with the decline of the vigorous regional states of the fifth to
fourth centuries BC, the area in general undergoes a rapid econ-
omic and political regression, to reach a new nadir by the early
imperial period.
4 To take the prehistoric fluctuations, for example, this list is
representative of the chief factors held to explain cultural and
population take-off in standard textbooks by Vermeule
(1964), Renfrew (1972b; 1973) and Warren (1975).
5 Clearly by later middle bronze age and early Mycenaean times
elites are indicated by tumuli, shaft graves and mansions, and
even if the archaeological evidence for Geometric/Archaic
times seems to reflect a more abrupt rise of elites coinciding
with the population expansion towards the end ofthat period,
semi-historical legends agree on the earlier importance of kings
and hence at least a strong individual status distinction. So for
both Mycenaean and Classical civilisational origins a degree of
differentiation existed prior to the explosion of settlement and
massive conversion of the outfield. I would like to offer two
distinct and complementary explanations for these early
examples of social distinctions: firstly, to suggest that middle
bronze age mainland Greece and dark age southern Greece
were primarily composed of numerous tribal groupings of small
independent, and uncentralised communities, each recognising
for limited purposes a tribal leader or 'king'. Such a figure had
his prime function as war-leader and possibly as key performer
of tribal ritual. Here might be sought the origin or such pre-
cocious phenomena as the Mycenae Shaft Graves, or the semi-
historic kings of the Dark Ages, all before the tangible evidence
for civilisational take-off in terms of settlement numbers and
the rise of the palaces and towns that were to form the
physical power base for emergent states. Secondly, it is
possible to characterise the long-term development of Europe's
pre-industrial societies as conforming to a pattern of recurrent
cycles of agricultural and demographic expansion and con-
traction. If, at the lowest points in the cycle, low agrarian
densities offer equal opportunities to each cultivator, there
nonetheless ensues, as an intimate part of cultural recovery, a
seemingly inevitable process of social differentiation in land-
holding and agricultural wealth. In this localised transform-
ation numerous cultivators grow increasingly impoverished and
may become dependent on the rising group of 'big men'. In
terms of our initial spatial model (fig. 13.3), it may be hypoth-
esised that this second process of differentiation takes place
within the old infield, and one of the most important single
factors in addition is the unequal advantage being taken by
some individuals of the outfield, for herds and temporary cul-
tivation. But it may be suggested that these achieved, chief/
'big man' statuses were to be transformed into an ascribed,
hereditary squirearchy dominating the peasantry and the
possession of the land itself, as a result of the subsequent great
surge of population and associated land intake. It was this great
'colonisation' with its potential for concentrated surpluses and
manpower, nourished in the palm of the local elite, that
allowed the take-off of state apparatus and civilisation; hence
the low level of imperishable achievement (with rare excep-
tions) left for archaeology by the earlier elites. On the other
hand, these earlier, 'pre-expansion' elite groups do raise the
argument that the social inequalities of these two civilisations
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are merely developments from the claimed establishment over
Greece of an alien and superior race, respectively in early
middle bronze age and early dark age times, over indigenous
peoples. There is a growing tendency, to which this author
subscribes, to doubt the arrival of a conquering elite in the
first case quoted. With the Dark Age, on the other hand, there
is little doubt that there was a major population incursion into
Greece, of the Dorians, and by historic times it is quite clear in
a number of states that the economy is run on a master race-
serf race, Dorian—Indigene basis (e.g. Sparta, Thessaly). But
the same general pattern of aristocratic-serf society is equally
widespread amongst states where the arrivals were wholly or
partially integrated with the indigenes, or states where the
arrivals made no recorded impact (e.g. Athens, Arcadia). All in
all, then, there would seem to be a much broader process in
action, involving the internal differentiation of social groups on
the basis of the dynamics of landholding. The established
existence of an elite may indeed be a result of ethnic domi-
nance, though more commonly its origin should be sought in
earlier, less pronounced landholding differences; but in any
case the crucial element is the manipulation by that elite of the
process of colonisation of the outfield.
Cf. Vogt 1969. However, R.M. Adarhs has kindly pointed out
(pers. comm., August 1980) that a complicating factor with
the historical Mesoamerican Cargo System is its additional
function of preventing external, non-native, individuals from
assuming local government roles.
The rise of a landed elite, and its internal differentiation into a
graded hierarchy of regional and finally inter-regional inter-
dependence, will, in this model, have resulted in the breakdown
or replacement of the simpler preexisting tribal structure of
villages and war-leader/ritual leader. A socio-political trans-
formation of this nature has indeed often been claimed for
dark age/archaic Greece on the highly fragmentary indi-
cations gleaned from the critical study of myth, epic and later
historical tradition (cf. now Snodgrass 1980). It is tempting to
speculate on an application of this model to the inferred con-
trast between the socio-political structure of later neolithic and
early bronze age southern Britain, where Colin Renfrew has
argued plausibly for a transformation from 'group centred' to
'self centred' chieftain societies (cf. Renfrew 1979).
In addition to the references for Greco-Roman civilisation
cited earlier, cf. Finley 1971; Andrewes 1965 ; Snodgrass 1979,
1980.
The groundwork is in Chadwick 1976, whilst a brief summary
of this recent research appears in the minutes of the
Mycenaean Seminar (London Institute of Classical Studies) for
February 1979. However most of this new work is as yet
unpublished and is presented, with great gratitude, as pers.
comm. from Dr Chadwick.
Finley 1973;Garnsey 1976; Hopkins 1978; Jones 1964.
For a brilliant analysis see Postan 1972.
Data from Bintliff 1977a, and the ongoing Boeotia Survey
project in Central Greece under the joint direction of the
author and Anthony Snodgrass.
Chadwick, J. 1976. The Mycenaean World. Cambridge, University
Press.
Crumley, C.L. 1974. Celtic social structure. Anthropological Papers
of the Museum o f Anthropology 54. Ann Arbor, University
of Michigan.
Finley, M.I. 1971. ne Ancient Greeks. London, Allen Lane.
Finley, M.I. 1973. The Ancient Economy. London, Chatto and
Windus.
Frankenstein, S. and Rowlands, M.J. 1978. The internal structure and
regional context of early iron age society in south-western
Germany. Bulletin of the Institute o f Archaeology, University
of London 15: 73-112.
Garnsey, P. 1976. Peasants in ancient Roman Society. Journal of
Peasant Studies 3: 221-35.
Hopkins, K. 1978. Conquerors and Slaves. Cambridge, University
Press.
Jones, A.H.M. 1964. The Later Roman Empire 284-602 (3 vols.).
Oxford, University Press.
Lefebvre, H. 1963. La Vallée de Campan. Paris, Presses universitaires
de France.
Nash, D. 1975. The Celts of Central Gaul: some aspects of social and
economic development. D.Phil, dissertation, University of
Oxford.
Postan, M.M. 1972. The Medieval Economy and Society. London,
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Renfrew, C. 1972a. Patterns of population growth in the prehistoric
Aegean, in P.J. Ucko, R. Tringham and G.W. Dimbleby (eds.),
Man, Settlement and Urbanism. London, Duckworth, 383-99.
Renfrew, C. 1972b. The Emergence of Civilisation. London, Methuen.
Renfrew, C. 1973. Before Civilisation. New York, Alfred Knopf.
Renfrew, C. 1979. Investigations in Orkney. London, Society of
Antiquaries.
Snodgrass, A.M. 1977. Archaeology and the Rise of the Greek State -
An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge, University Press.
Snodgrass, A.M. 1979. The problem of scale: heavy freight and
archaic Greek trade. Unpublished paper presented to the
'Economic Archaeology' Conference, January 1979, New Hall,
Cambridge.
Snodgrass, A.M. 1980. Archaic Greece. London, Dent.
Vermeule, E. 1964. Greece in the Bronze Age. Chicago, University
Press.
Vogt, E.Z. 1969. The Zinacantan. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Warren, P. 1975. The Aegean Civilisations. Oxford, Elsevier-Phaidon.
References
Andrewes, A. 1965. The growth of the city state, in H. Lloyd-Jones
(ed.), The Greek World. London, Allen Lane, 22-65.
Andrewes, A. 1977. Greek Society. London, Allen Lane.
Bintliff, J.L. 1977a. Natural Environment and Human Settlement in
Prehistoric Greece. Oxford, British Archaeological Reports.
Bintliff, J.L. (ed.) 1977b. Mycenaean Geography. Cambridge, British
Association for-Mycenaean Studies.
